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IN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT MANAGEMENT: 
THE OSCE AND THE UN AS NORM LEADERS 
 
 
Alice Ackerman 
Abstract 
This article explores the emergence of conflict prevention as an emerging norm in 
international conflict management. In particular, it examines the role of the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the United Nations as primary actors in the 
construction and promotion of conflict prevention as an international norm. The article 
describes some of the major instruments that both organizations have already developed to 
implement the prevention of armed conflict on a more consistent rather than ad hoc basis. The 
article traces the emergent norm of conflict prevention through three stages—the awareness-
raising and advocacy stage; the acceptance and institutionalization stage; and the 
internationalization stage. Although it is argued that conflict prevention as an emerging norm 
may eventually become firmly institutionalized and internationalized, at this point in time it 
remains for the most part in the advocacy stage. Regional organizations, such as the OSCE, 
have been more successful in moving conflict prevention toward acceptance and 
institutionalization, albeit on a regional level. 
Introduction 
  Since the early 1990s the international climate has increasingly permitted new 
thinking and the implementation of concrete actions when it comes to the management of 
violent conflicts. The reasons for this are not only the need to control the new security 
environment, but also changing political developments such as the end of the cold war, which 
allowed for the acceptance of new practices and behaviour. Thus we are witnessing dramatic 
changes when it comes to new normative thinking regarding intervention for humanitarian 
purposes, limits to state sovereignty in the face of gross human rights violations, the protection 
of minorities, post-conflict peace building and reconciliation, and conflict prevention. This is a 
markedly significant phenomenon--one that goes well beyond those practices that defined the 
cold war period.  
Responding to violent conflicts in their early, non-escalatory stage has become part of 
what is often referred to as “global governance.” Moreover, within the field of conflict 
resolution it is increasingly recognized that conflict prevention is a vital component in a 
broader approach to conflict management—one, that entails not only measures to manage the 
escalatory or post-violent phases of conflict, but also the pre-violent or low-violent stage 
where it might be still possible to prevent the outbreak of large-scale hostilities and bloodshed. 
Much of this new normative environment has come as the result of concerted advocacy 
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on the part of norm leaders or norm advocates. These are actors that take a critical role in the 
emergence of new international norms and practices because they are able to articulate and 
promote new normative conditions and can mobilize support from other actors, often through 
the creation of organizational platforms. Such norm leaders or advocates can be single 
individuals, but also international and regional organizations, non-governmental actors and 
transnational advocacy movements, and national governments. When it comes to conflict 
prevention, there have been significant strides in advancing the idea and practice of preventing 
armed conflicts.  
The importance of preventive action as an international policy is now actively 
supported by a number of international and regional organizations, such as the UN, the World 
Bank, the European Union and the European Commission, the OSCE, the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), but also sub-regional organizations such as 
the Southern Africa Development Community or the Economic Community of West African 
States. Moreover, the developmental agencies of several major countries, including the U.S. 
Agency for International Development (USAID) and the British Department for International 
Development (DFID) as well as non-governmental actors have followed suit in implementing 
programs to facilitate long-term conflict prevention (Ackermann, 2003; Lund, 2002). 
This article will explore in particular the contributions that the UN and the OSCE have 
made in the articulation and implementation of an idea—namely, that violent conflicts can be 
prevented in their early stages before they have entered into an escalatory phase. There are 
numerous norm advocates now on the international stage consistently and actively seeking to 
establish new international norms in the managing of armed conflicts, particularly when it 
comes to conflict prevention. However, it is the UN and the OSCE that assumed an early role 
in the construction and promotion of a global norm of conflict prevention.  
Conflict prevention in the context of this study is defined as “any structural or 
intercessory means to keep intrastate or interstate tensions and disputes from escalating into 
significant violence and use of armed forces, to strengthen the capabilities of potential parties 
to violent conflict for resolving such disputes peacefully and to progressively reduce the 
underlying problems that produce these issues and disputes” (Lund, 2002, p. 117, ftn. 6). This 
article also adopts a comprehensive approach to conflict prevention, including in the 
discussion on preventive measures and instruments both the operational (also direct or 
proximate) and structural dimensions of prevention. Structural prevention, also referred to as 
“deep prevention,” is long-term in nature and refers to any preventive measures that eliminate 
the underlying causes of conflict. This would include measures such as the facilitation of good 
governance, adherence to human rights, and economic, political, and societal stability, and 
civil society building. Operational prevention is directed toward imminent crises and therefore 
includes fact-finding and monitoring missions, negotiation, mediation, dialogue among 
contending groups, preventive deployments, or confidence-building measures (Ackermann, 
2000; Annan 1999; Carnegie Commission, 1997; Miall, Ramsbotham & Woodhouse, 1999) 
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The Emergence of International Norms and Conflict Resolution 
 
The evolution of domestic and international norms has been mostly studied in the 
literature on international relations. This literature focuses on questions on how norms emerge, 
how they shape the interests and identities of states, and how they become internalized and 
implemented internationally and domestically (Finnemore, 1996; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998; 
Goertz & Diehl, 1992; Katzenstein, 1996; Klotz, 1995; Checkel, 1999; Florini, 1996). Yet 
there still have been few attempts in that literature to explore the emergence of new norms and 
practices in international conflict management. There are numerous examples that call for 
more empirical research on emergent norms in the field of conflict resolution. For one, when 
we look at the emergence of a conflict prevention norm, we can discern a web of other 
emergent norms in international conflict management. These include not only conflict 
prevention but also norms on humanitarian intervention, post-conflict peace building and 
reconciliation, peace enforcement, and peace maintenance. 
In the context of this study, norms are defined as standards of acceptable and 
appropriate behavior, or shared understandings on standards for behavior. Norms, once 
internalized by actors in the international community, can also be viewed as established 
practices and codes of conduct. Norms also entail the belief that there are shared values and 
principles. While they do not exclusively determine action, norms create the permissive 
conditions that enable a particular action. It is important to note that newly emergent norms 
tend to compete with already firmly entrenched norms. This is the case with the norm of 
sovereignty and non-intervention that directly conflicts with emergent norms of limited 
sovereignty and humanitarian intervention. Therefore, norms are not equal when it comes to 
their influence, their salience, and their acceptance by a critical number of international actors 
(Finnemore, 1996; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998; Flynn & Farrell, 1999; McCoy & Heckel, 
2001; Ingebritsen, 2002) 
Norm theory provides a powerful analytical tool for explaining the emergence of new 
norms and practices in international politics and the normative environment in which such 
changes occur. New practices and norms have their origins in ideas, defined here as principled 
beliefs. Such principled beliefs spell out what is right or wrong, just or unjust, and what ought 
to be (Goldstein & Keohane, 1993). According to Finnemore and Sikkink (1998), studies on 
norms demonstrate how political reality gets created on the basis of people’s ideas about what 
ought to be and what is good. Moreover, they contend that significant changes have come 
about in world politics because of individuals with principled commitments. There are plenty 
of examples of such changes based on the construction of new norms, such as the abolition of 
slavery, women’s rights, decolonization, the anti-apartheid movement, humanitarian 
intervention, humanitarian law, and the protection of minority and group rights.  
One of the most potent examples of how principled beliefs underlie the construction of 
norms is that of human rights. The emergence and subsequent internationalization of 
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international human rights norms, now widely accepted in the international community, can be 
traced to the aftermath of World War II. The European experience of genocide, systematic 
mass killings, torture and arbitrary detentions gave rise to the idea--and eventually a new 
norm--that there was a responsibility to protect human rights through internationally-agreed 
upon regulations and policies (Sikkink, 1993; Risse, Ropp, & Sikkink, 1999). The aftermath of 
World War II also facilitated the emergence of norms that promoted peaceful change in 
Europe. These were a set of clusters of norms that entailed integration as a means to peace in 
Europe and reconciliation among former enemies. These norms of peaceful change, if one may 
call them so, supplanted those norms and behaviors that permitted the use of violence for 
settling disputes and conflicts of interests. What these examples illustrate is that changes in the 
behavior of states were driven by normative agendas and concerns. 
Empirical research on norms demonstrates that norm advocates or norm leaders 
consciously construct or build norms. This is done primarily through calling attention to 
particular problems, often through the construction of cognitive frames—that is, through the 
use of particular language that enables the naming, interpreting, and dramatizing of such 
problems or issues. Norm advocates share principled beliefs and commitments as to 
appropriate or acceptable behavior, and seek to make lasting and radical changes in 
international behavior. Seen in this context, norms can be understood not merely as 
constraining behavior, but rather as enabling particular action that may otherwise not occur 
(Finnemore, 1996, Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998; Flynn & Farrell, 1999).  
There are contending perspectives as to why new norms emerge. Some scholars believe 
that they are the result of social learning and societal pressures, as was the case with the anti-
slavery norm. Others argue that new norms emerge through some cataclysmic event as 
happened with the human rights norm that emerged gradually after 1945 out of the genocidal 
experience in Europe (Crawford, 1993). Norms also emerge from already existing webs of 
international norms; in this case, such emergent norms stand a better chance of being 
successful in being adopted internationally (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998; McCoy & Heckel, 
2001). Three casual factors have been associated with the emergence of new norms: changes in 
the global environment such as major systemic transitions or dramatic events; social processes 
that have taken place on a global level, such as the increase of social interaction among actors 
and the diffusion of information; and internal developments within states, particularly when it 
comes to motivational and cognitive processes of leadership or other changes in the domestic 
environment (Kowert & Legro, 1996). 
The evolution of new norms can be traced through stages. In the first stage of a norm 
life cycle, norm advocates are actively engaged in building norms. Often this is accomplished 
through the creation of an organizational platform from which the content of a new norm can 
be articulated and promoted. This is also referred to as the awareness-raising and advocacy 
stage. Important in this phase are three processes: the use of cognitive frames by norm 
advocates to identify and widely publicize a particular international problem that needs to be 
addressed and changed; increasing levels of activism on the part of norm advocates; and the 
support of critical states and platform organizations, either in disseminating information, in 
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providing financial assistance, or in assuming crucial leadership. The objective in this stage is 
to persuade other states and actors to adopt new norms. Stage 2 entails the acceptance and 
institutionalization of a norm through the development of policy and legal instruments; in 
Stage 3, one can witness the internalization of a norm, meaning its widespread adoption and 
adherence through the creation of monitoring and enforcement mechanisms which are intended 
to guarantee norm implementation over time (McCoy & Heckel, 2001; Finnemore & Sikkink, 
1998).  
It is argued in this article that the norm of conflict prevention with regard to its growth 
process is solidly situated in the first stage. However, it is making its way into the second 
stage, given that we can already observe the development of policy instruments that allow for 
some implementation. Even though stage three is not going to be reached any time soon, what 
is demonstrated in this article is that the OSCE and the UN have been playing a major role as 
norm leaders when it comes to the construction of a conflict prevention norm. The following 
analysis highlights the role of these two institutions in the evolution of a conflict prevention 
norm. 
The OSCE: Taking the Lead in Norm-Setting 
No other regional organization has carried conflict prevention as an emergent 
international norm as much forward as the OSCE. There are several reasons why the OSCE 
has been at the forefront of constructing, advocating, and implementing new international 
norms, not only in conflict prevention, but also in crisis management, post-conflict peace 
building, and the peaceful settlement of conflicts. For one, the OSCE is a unique institution 
with a highly innovative character. It takes a comprehensive approach to security and its 
mandate is extensive enough for it to function as a cooperative security organization with a 
broad security agenda. Moreover, the OSCE is a strictly political organization with a small 
institutional structure, allowing for greater flexibility than some other international 
organizations. While OSCE decisions are not legally binding, its member states have over time 
agreed collectively and as a matter of choice on a number of norms through which security can 
be maintained and conflict can be managed (OSCE, 2000; Zellner, 2002). These rules and 
standards are politically binding and laid down in a series of documents, even though OSCE 
participating States may at times disregard their commitments.  
According to Gregory Flynn and Henry Farrell (1999), there are “no historical 
precedents” for the type of  “constructive intervention” as practiced by the OSCE, and the 
normative foundation that was created as early as the 1970s. This normative framework has 
since then been expanded, and it underlies the “constructive” or “cooperative” intervention that 
the OSCE is engaged in (Zellner, 2002, p.16). Moreover, the OSCE is perceived as having the 
necessary legitimacy to manage conflicts—its existing institutional mechanisms for conflict 
management have been legitimized by its participating States through collective decision-
making and consensus (Flynn & Farrell, 1999). It is this high level of legitimacy that enables 
the OSCE to intervene in the internal affairs of member states (Zellner, 2002, p.16). The 
OSCE’s experiences with conflict prevention and conflict management can be traced to the 
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organization’s humble beginnings as an international regime in the early 1970s. Since the 
OSCE’s history is already well documented (see Bloed, 1993; Heraclides, 1993), it suffices 
here to only briefly outline the earliest attempts of actively building, advocating, and 
implementing new international norms.  
Founded in the summer of 1975 through what became known as the Helsinki Final Act, 
the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), as the OSCE was named then, 
was to function as a forum to facilitate East-West dialogue. Its preventive capacity rested on 
the idea and the necessity to build constructive and cooperative relationships on an interstate 
level in the Cold War era. It has been documented that this relationship building as a 
preventive mechanism was successful in the transformation of the East-West conflict (see 
Thomas, 1999). The Helsinki Final Act, adopted during the Helsinki Summit (30 July to 1 
August 1975), constitutes the initial normative framework on which the OSCE still rests. It 
laid down a number of agreed upon norms such as refraining from the threat or use of force, 
the inviolability of frontiers, the peaceful settlement of disputes, and respect for human rights. 
It also introduced confidence-building measures that were to assist in the promotion of 
peaceful change (OSCE, 2000).  
When the Cold War ended, the CSCE was transformed from an international regime to 
a regional security organization, and became increasingly engaged in the prevention and 
management of conflicts, albeit now primarily on the intrastate level. The Paris Charter for a 
New Europe signed on 21 November 1990 during the Paris summit created a number of 
permanent bodies and institutions, such as the Secretariat, now in Vienna, the Warsaw-based 
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, and the Conflict Prevention Centre in 
Vienna. During the Berlin Council Meeting in June 1991, the CSCE also created a special 
mechanism for emergency consultations in times of crises. This so-called “Berlin Mechanism” 
was used for the first time during the Yugoslav crisis. Then in December 1992 the post of the 
Secretary-General was created and, in 1993, the Permanent Committee (in 1994, renamed 
“Permanent Council”), all of which were intended to expand the OSCE’s ability to engage in 
political consultation, dialogue, and decision-making, particularly when it came to conflict and 
crisis prevention. 
One of the most crucial documents for the development and institutionalization of a 
conflict prevention, early warning, and crisis management capacity was the 1992 Helsinki 
Document, adopted during the July 1992 Helsinki Summit. In it, two principal instruments of 
conflict prevention and crisis management are specifically outlined: 1) fact-finding and 
rapporteur missions; and 2) peacekeeping missions—to be dispatched not in a peace 
enforcement capacity but more so in a preventive one, and to cover interethnic as well as 
interstate conflicts. The Helsinki Document also created the position of High Commissioner on 
National Minorities (HCNM), an office that “provides early warning and ... early action at the 
earliest possible stage in regard to tensions involving national minority issues which have not 
yet developed beyond an early warning stage….” (CSCE, 1992, p. 12). Originally a Dutch 
initiative, the creation of the Office of the HCNM meant yet another preventive mechanism 
that could be employed in the emerging stages of conflict. Accordingly, “early warning was to 
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be carried out by collecting information on national minorities, by exploring the role of all 
contending parties, and, most important by visiting those states where conflict seemed 
imminent or where ethnic tensions continued to disrupt the political and social 
order” (Ackermann, 2000, p. 133). To this day, these visits are a particularly important element 
in the ability of the HCNM to issue early warnings of potential conflicts to the Chairman-in-
Office. Also, one of the most important tools available to the HCNM are his written 
recommendations, which, although not binding, are crucial for preventive action. Thus the 
HCNM has been considered “a highly effective and cost-effective institution for conflict 
prevention” (Zellner, 2002, p.21). 
Since the early 1970s, the CSCE/OSCE has not only been able to actively construct and 
promote a series of new norms. Moreover, it has been successful in the creation of policy 
instruments to move particular norms into the direction of institutionalization, or Stage 2 of the 
norm life cycle. This has been the case with the norm of conflict prevention. Since the end of 
the Cold War, the OSCE has implemented an impressive list of instruments and institutional 
mechanisms for the prevention of violent conflicts. These include the following: fact-finding 
and rapporteur missions, field missions, the Office of the High Commissioner on National 
Minorities, the Conflict Prevention Centre and its Operation Centre, created at the 1999 
Istanbul Summit, the use of a personal representative of the Chairman-in-Office, and ad hoc 
steering groups. Among the most commonly used instruments for conflict prevention are the 
field missions and the HCNM. The earliest field missions date back to 1992, including those to 
Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina, and Macedonia. There have also been missions to the 
Caucasus, Central Asia, the Baltic States, and Eastern Europe. A high concentration of field 
missions continues to be in South-Eastern Europe, with the largest at present being the OSCE 
Mission in Kosovo (OMIK). 
Not all field missions have come as a result of preventive action. In the case of the 
more recent missions to Croatia, Kosovo, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, their function is primarily 
within the domain of post-conflict rehabilitation, although one may argue that conflict 
prevention must also be incorporated into the post-conflict phase. In fact, the major focus of 
OSCE missions in the Balkans has now shifted to post-conflict rehabilitation. However, a few 
of the field missions, such as the one to Estonia and to Macedonia, were truly preventive in 
nature. Moreover, there are OSCE Centres in the five Central Asian republics that for the most 
part have a preventive core to deal with a variety of potential sources of conflict, including 
disputes regarding water resources, interethnic rivalries, particularly in the Ferghana Valley, 
deepening poverty and economic disparities, insurgencies and radical Islamic movements, and 
trafficking of arms, drugs, and people (European Centre for Conflict Prevention, 2002). 
The OSCE Spillover Mission to Skopje is a particular good case in point in 
demonstrating how a preventive mission has been transformed into a peace implementation 
mission after violent conflict. But the case of Macedonia also provides an excellent case study 
for new practices in conflict prevention. It was in Macedonia that the CSCE/OSCE, from 1992 
onward employed two preventive mechanisms that reflect the institution’s commitment to 
conflict prevention—the creation of a field mission and the regular fact-finding and mediation 
2 The CSCE became the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe on 1 January 1995 
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visits by the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities. Although there was a short-
lived outbreak of violent conflict in 2001, for nearly nine years, OSCE efforts were crucial for 
the peaceful conduct of majority-minority relations, largely through assisting in addressing 
ethnic grievances and demands, maintaining a moderating influence on the political elites, and 
early warning when interethnic tensions threatened to undermine conflict management efforts 
(Ackermann, 2000). 
 
The United Nations’ Advocacy of Conflict Prevention 
Although the idea that armed conflicts should be prevented underlies the Charter of the 
United Nations, it was not until several decades after the ratification of the Charter that the 
United Nations actually began to use consistently the terms “preventive diplomacy” and 
“conflict prevention” in any of its official statements. Moreover, throughout the Cold War, UN 
interventions were rather reactive than preventive in nature. The first time the term “preventive 
diplomacy” came into official use was in 1960 when UN Secretary-General Dag 
Hammarskjőld reflected on the limited powers of the United Nations during the Cold War. At 
the time, Hammarskjőld defined preventive diplomacy as a UN effort to keep “newly arising 
conflicts outside the sphere of bloc difference,” and to localize any conflicts so as to prevent a 
wider confrontation between the superpowers (UN, General Assembly, 1960). In this sense, 
conflict prevention was solely directed at preventing a war between the United States and the 
Soviet Union, but not at preventing armed conflicts altogether. It was nearly thirty years later 
that the United Nations initiated a shift toward advocating the prevention of violent conflicts, 
particularly those on an intra-state level. 
One can trace UN advocacy for a global conflict prevention norm to the late 1980s 
when the General Assembly in its Annex to the 1988 “Declaration on the Prevention and 
Removal of Disputes and Situations Which May Threaten International Peace and Security,” 
formally recognized the role of the United Nations in the prevention of international conflicts. 
Moreover, it impressed upon member states to take direct responsibility for preventing 
conflicts. Therefore, the Annex spelled out a number of recommendations on how states could 
prevent disputes, most of which were centered on traditional diplomatic means, such as 
bilateral and multilateral consultations. It did however also envision a more active role for the 
Security Council in conflict prevention. It was to “consider, sending at an early stage, fact-
finding or good offices missions or establishing appropriate forms of United Nations 
presence” (UN, General Assembly, 1988). Thus already in 1988 the United Nations captured 
the important essence of conflict prevention in that preventive measures had to be initiated in 
the early stages of a conflict. Much of this was reiterated in a follow-on document in 1991, the 
Annex to the “Declaration on Fact-Finding by the United Nations in the Field of the 
Maintenance of International Peace and Security.” Again, as in the 1988 document, the 1991 
Annex identified fact-finding in the early stages as a major instrument for conflict prevention 
and vested the Secretary-General with more powers to initiate preventive fact-finding missions 
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on his own (UN, General Assembly, 1991; see also Sokalski, 2003). 
Awareness-raising and advocacy for preventive action received a critical boost when 
former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali made preventive diplomacy one of the 
center pieces of his 1992 report, An Agenda for Peace. Disseminated widely in the 
international public domain, An Agenda for Peace came as a result of a Security Council 
request on 31 January 1992 for the Secretary-General to prepare for UN member states by July 
1 recommendations for strengthening the UN capacity for preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, 
and peacekeeping. It was left to the Secretary-General to define what preventive diplomacy 
was, and what its parameters ought to be. Boutros–Ghali opted for a rather broad definition of 
preventive diplomacy, defining it as “action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, 
to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter 
when they occur.” Thus preventive diplomacy was to fulfill three critical objectives: 
prevention in the early stage of conflict, prevention of escalation, and containment once 
conflict had broken out (UN, Secretary-General, 1992). 
Moreover, the report did not view preventive diplomacy in a vacuum or as an isolated 
UN activity. In An Agenda for Peace, the entire spectrum of a violent conflict cycle was 
addressed. Not only was the prevention of violent conflict to entail preventive diplomacy, but 
also post-conflict peace building measures such as peacemaking and peacekeeping. In fact, 
preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, and peacekeeping were regarded as “integrally related.” 
What appeared novel in this document was that it was considered no longer sufficient anymore 
for the United Nations to put all its energies into peacekeeping but that a wider range of 
instruments and activities had to be adopted that covered all stages of the conflict cycle. In that 
sense, the prevention of violent conflicts included both a pre-violent/early conflict phase, an 
escalation phase, and a post-conflict phase, making preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, and 
peacekeeping part of a wider conflict resolution approach. Moreover, An Agenda for Peace 
suggested wide-ranging preventive practices, including: (1) confidence-building measures; (2) 
fact-finding missions by senior UN officials or members of regional or non-governmental 
organizations; (3) the strengthening of early networks, to include political instability 
indicators; (4) preventive deployment; and (5) the creation of demilitarized zones. While 
confidence-building measures, fact-finding, and demilitarized zones had already been 
established UN practices, early warning networks and preventive deployment were novel 
concepts, of which the latter was initiated for the first time only a few months after An Agenda 
for Peace appeared. 
Although preventive diplomacy still remained a vague and mostly rhetorical concept, 
what was significant was that Boutros-Ghali had revived the notion of preventive diplomacy to 
make it fit the changed international climate. Moreover, norms advocacy took on a new 
dimension when in December 1992, the Security Council authorized for the first time in UN 
history the deployment of a preventive peacekeeping mission. The deployment came much by 
way of how Boutros-Ghali had envisioned it: a country that “feels threatened and requests the 
deployment of an appropriate United Nations presence along its side of the border” (UN, 
Secretary-General, 1992, p. 6). This country was the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
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whose President, Kiro Gligorov, appealed for a UN preventive force at the United Nations 
Headquarters in November 1992 in light of the potential spillover of violence from the other 
Yugoslav republics. 
On 11 December 1992, Security Council Resolution 795, approved unanimously, 
authorized the immediate deployment of a preventive mission to Macedonia’s borders with 
Albania and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The UN mandate was explicitly preventive 
and justified on two grounds: 1) concerns over “possible developments which could undermine 
confidence and stability in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia or threaten its 
territory;” and (2) a request by the Macedonian government. In early January 1993, the first 
UN contingent arrived, later renamed, the UN Preventive Deployment (UNPREDEP) mission. 
UNPREDEP remained in Macedonia for six years, and the mission was terminated on 1 March 
1999, but only following China’s veto at the Security Council on 26 February 1999, after 
Beijing objected to Macedonia’s establishment of diplomatic relations with Taiwan.  
However, what the UN preventive mission demonstrates, even though there has never 
been another incident of preventive deployment, is that the Security Council demonstrated 
some incentive and willingness to put preventive diplomacy into action when it was in fact 
urgently needed. That there have been no other such preventive deployment missions does not 
necessarily prove that the UN failed in its advocacy role. Rather the lack of more preventive 
action is due mostly to the fact that the newly emerging norm of conflict prevention is directly 
competing with the norm of sovereignty and non-intervention. We can observe a similar 
phenomenon when it comes to interventions for humanitarian purposes whereby the emergent 
norm of humanitarian intervention conflicts with the sovereignty norm 
Although there have not been any other preventive deployment missions, there are 
other indicators that conflict prevention as a newly emerging norm on the international level is 
moving slowly toward stage 2. For one, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan has been fine-
tuning the norms discourse. In fact, Annan has done much to advance the idea and practice of 
conflict prevention. Since assuming office, his objective has been to move the United Nations 
from a “culture of reaction” to a “culture of prevention.” Among the most comprehensive 
assessments on the UN capacity toward conflict prevention has been his 2001 report on the 
“Prevention of Armed Conflict” (UN, General Assembly, 2001). In the report, Annan calls on 
other actors—regional institutions, non-governmental organizations, member states, the private 
sector, and the civil society sector to cooperate with the United Nations when it comes to the 
implementation of a successful conflict prevention strategy. But he makes it also clear that 
member states must take responsibility for building a national capacity in conflict prevention, 
rather than relying solely on the United Nations to be the leading preventive actor. To that end, 
the United Nations is willing to provide member states with training in conflict prevention. 
This is merely one way in which Annan thinks that conflict prevention can move from the 
rhetorical to the practical level, and perhaps eventually become institutionalized. 
3 For example, the widely-read and prestigious U.S. journal, Foreign Affairs, published an article written by Boutros-Ghali, entitled “An Agenda for Peace.” 
4 I am indebted to Henryk Sokalski , the former UN  Assistant Secretary-General and Special Representative of the Secretary– General for the United Nations 
Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) in Macedonia for this information. For a detailed analysis on the development of conflict prevention within the 
United Nations, see his forthcoming book, An Ounce of Prevention: Macedonia and the UN Experience in Preventive Diplomacy (Washington, DC: US 
Institute of Peace, 2003).  
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Conclusions 
It is clear from the preceding discussion that one can speak of a conflict prevention 
norm only in the context of one that is newly emerging in the international environment. While 
the OSCE and the United Nations have indeed acted as norm leaders or norm advocates, 
participating actively in the constructing of a new conflict prevention norm, this norm, as far as 
its origins are concerned, remains in stage 1 of the norm life-cycle—the awareness-raising and 
advocacy stage. However, the OSCE has been more active and effective in pushing conflict 
prevention as a norm to its next stage. Thus, one can witness some progress toward norm 
acceptance and institutionalization, primarily because the OSCE has been successful in 
developing and implementing policy instruments for the operationalization of conflict 
prevention. Much of the OSCE’s success in that direction can be credited to the fact that it is a 
smaller institution and that it has already a long history of preventing violent conflicts through 
cooperative measures and agreements on a set of norms that determined the behavior of states 
during the Cold War era. Moreover, there are a number of states, including Sweden, Denmark, 
and the Netherlands that have taken the lead in norm advocacy when it comes to conflict 
prevention. 
On the other hand, the United Nations, under the leadership of Boutros Boutros-Ghali 
and Kofi Annan, while influential in actively advocating conflict prevention as a new norm 
and practice in international conflict management, has met with less success in the actual 
implementation of conflict prevention policy instruments, largely because of objections of 
some of its member states who fear that preventive action can turn easily into unauthorized 
international intervention. It is here that the newly emergent norm of conflict prevention 
continues to compete with the norm of sovereignty and non-intervention. Moreover, effective 
prevention requires that preventive action plans and strategies be designed and that these must 
be institutionalized over time. The United Nations is still far away from this objective, even 
though Annan’s culture of prevention is envisioning such a course in the future.  
Nevertheless, when it comes to the actual implementation of preventive action, it is 
crucial to also emphasize the complementary roles that the OSCE and UN have played both in 
norm setting and in practice on the ground. This was particular the case in Macedonia where 
the OSCE and the UN had similar mandates in terms of its monitoring component, and where 
both organizations also worked closely together on special projects that were preventive in 
nature.  
As for future prospects, conflict prevention will most likely be successful in becoming 
fully institutionalized and internalized as a regional norm, since it is on the regional level, that 
this emergent norm is already becoming firmly entrenched in its second stage, that of a wider 
acceptance by national governments and other non-state actors. As to conflict prevention as an 
international norm, this remains a process in the making for some time to come, although it 
will be highly fascinating to observe and to document the pace in which conflict prevention as 
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an emerging international norm will move from being an idea to becoming a political reality. 
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